Abstract In recent decades, the security agenda for states and international organisations has expanded to include a range of 'non-traditional', transnational security issues. Globalisation is often seen as a key driver for the emergence or intensification of these problems, but, surprisingly, little sustained scholarly effort has been made to examine the link between responses to the new security agenda and the changing political economy. This special issue, which this article introduces, aims to overcome this significant gap. In particular, it focuses on three key themes: the broad relationship between security and political economy; what is being secured in the name of security and how this has changed; and how things are being secured -what modes of governance have emerged to manage security problems. In all of these areas, the contributions point to the crucial role of the state in translating shifting state-economy relations to new security definitions and practices.
globalisation have tended to focus on economic governance, but have rarely considered the expansion of the security agenda and its implications for governance beyond the state, or indeed the interrelations between this expansion and broader political economic transformations (for example, Marchand et al, 1999; Mansfield and Solingen, 2010; Sinclair, 2012; Weiss and Wilkinson, 2014) .
This apparent failure to probe the links between the new security agenda and the changing political economy stems partly from historical divisions within the International Relations (IR) discipline, and partly from the dominance of NTS studies by approaches that largely neglect economic factors. The legacy of IR's artificial bifurcation into the subfields of IS and International Political Economy (IPE) is the absence of a strong tradition of interrogating the interrrelations between evolutions in economic and security dynamics, the examples cited above being exceptions rather than the rule. Furthermore, while IPE scholars are alert to the role of non-state actors in governing so-called 'low' politics, the statism of much IS scholarship does not admit such a role in the 'high' politics of security. Path-breaking work that does so is very scarce (for example, Abrahamsen and Williams, 2011) . In addition, the study of NTS has been pioneered largely by scholars in the constructivist and poststructuralist traditions, who typically downplay or neglect economic factors. While producing illuminating accounts of how discursive strategies and power-knowledge shape security agendas and policies (for example, Buzan et al, 1998; Aradau and van Munster, 2007) , they have generally failed to situate these developments within the material evolution of the global political economy. As such, this special issue is the first collective effort to understand the relationship between NTS, its governance and the political economy, both theoretically and empirically.
Theoretically, this special issue attends to the question of the relationship between the new security agenda and the political economy by drawing attention to three key issues. The first is the broad relationship between political economy and securityhow can IPE's concerns, theories and concepts enhance IS studies? The nodal point for this relationship appears to be the state. The state is a blind-spot for large parts of IS scholarship, which typically remains confined within IR's 'territorial trap' (Agnew, 1994) , presupposing the fit between state power and the national territory. But even where centralised control over national territories is problematised in the literature, the implicit assumption is that these are instances of deficient statehood. We delve deeper into the sources and dimensions of state power to explore how shifting state-economy relations translate into changing understandings and practices of security, with states moving from the consolidation of national markets and, correspondingly 'national security', to grappling with the 'dark side of globalisation'.
The second issue our contributions examine is the important question of what is now being secured in the name of 'security'. Historically, we observe that the object of security has shifted increasingly from protecting national states, markets and populations to protecting global flows of trade, investment and capital accumulation from the social, economic and environmental contradictions caused by capitalist development. This is not to say that the new security agenda crudely reflects the narrow economic interests of dominant groups. However, because of the inherent links between NTS and the economy, the new security agenda does touch on the interests of powerful societal interests, including business, giving these groups a stake in how 'security' is defined and managed, which often influences governance outcomes.
The third issue is to understand changes in how these objects are being secured: what new modes of governance are emerging to tackle threats seen as transnational and too large and complex for the old model of sovereign statehood to address? Understanding new modes of security governance is crucial because, whereas with 'traditional' security problems state sovereignty and the inviolability of national control over national territories were seen to underpin international security and stability, in the case of NTS issues, insistence on sovereignty and non-interference is often seen as the main impediment for developing an adequate response. The 'securitisation' of transboundary issues is frequently accompanied by pressuresoften from powerful states and international agencies -to develop new, transnational forms of governance that erode sovereign statehood and reconfigure states to better contain and manage these threats at their point of origin.
In studying emergent forms of security governance, this special issue draws particular attention to the transformation of statehood, which is also associated with changes in the global political economy. The state remains the main site for struggles over security's meaning and its governance, but global capitalist development, as well as political conflicts over security governance, are changing the very nature of statehood. The increasingly fragmented, regulatory nature of states and associated forms of networked and multilevel governance, often observed in economic governance (see Bache and Flinders, 2004) , are also appearing in security governance, despite the statist expectations of mainstream IR theory. Indeed, to some extent, the very emergence of NTS on the security agenda reflects the prior development of regulatory state forms, where central states merely set broad policy directions and considerable autonomy in interpreting and implementing these goals is delegated to sub-, quasi-and non-state actors. This is because measuring and managing many NTS issues -climate change, environmental degradation and pandemic disease, for example -is often seen to require specialised forms of scientific and managerial expertise, free from political 'interference'. In turn, the identification of new security issues may also propel the state's fragmentation further, rather than reinforcing the centralisation of power, again contradicting the assumptions of conventional IR approaches. A further aspect of capitalist development's influence on security governance is the dominance of the neoliberal framing of the state-market relationship, which often directs policymakers towards 'market solutions' to new security threats and risks, with frequently perverse outcomes. The mainstream response to climate change, particularly the development of regional and global markets for carbon credits, has demonstrated especially clearly the ideological primacy of neoliberalism, and the tremendous power of societal interests served by such 'light touch', market-based responses.
The theoretical approach taken to these questions is necessarily pluralist, as befits a collection exploring a new field. Each contribution takes a political economy approach, analysing a particular security issue and its governance in relation to both politics and economics simultaneously. However, the contributors' theoretical understanding of political economy varies from liberalism to Marxism, with attendant consequences for the relative weight placed upon, and understanding of, class relations and power, as well as the nature and role of the state. From an IR theory perspective, the contributions are also diverse. Importantly, they include articles by constructivist and poststructuralist scholars that engage with economic factors in order to tackle a prior neglect and deepen their respective approaches. This eclecticism thus illustrates how proponents of many different approaches may begin to probe the political economy of NTS issues and their governance.
Empirically, the contributions roam widely, demonstrating the significance and relevance of the special issue's themes across different issue-areas and geographical regions. The articles cover many of the key NTS issues of our time, including climate change, pandemic disease and energy security, as well as key concepts, such as 'police' and 'risk', often used to describe new modes of security governance and the nature of contemporary NTS problems, respectively. Geographically, the special issue's contributions refer to practices in diverse parts of the world, including the West, Russia, the Middle East, China, Southeast Asia and Australasia. In all regions and across all issue-areas we find that similar processes of state transformation are underway in response to the perceived emergence of NTS issues, although this process is always contested and uneven, shaped by specific political economy and local socio-political struggles.
This introductory article proceeds to examine the special issue's three primary themes in turn, reflecting on existing research and its limitations, and outlining how the various articles advance our understanding of these issues.
Security, Political Economy and the State
IS scholars have generally understood the expansion of the security agenda to encompass a wide range of issues beyond the traditional concern with inter-state warfare and state survival in one of two ways. For scholars adopting a realist ontology, it reflects governments' and international organisations' responses to objective changes in the threat environment. For many of these scholars, industrialisation and later the intensification of economic globalisation processes are key causal factors in the rise of the new security agenda. Rapid economic development is seen to have generated an increased incidence of environmental disasters, new infectious diseases and climate change (Dupont, 2001; Brown, 2003; Elbe, 2008) . Associated improvements in communication and transportation technologies, so crucial to the smooth global circulation of capital, are also seen to enable new forms of networked organised crime and terrorism (Libicki, 2001) , making it increasingly difficult for governments to protect their populations.
The trouble with this perspective is that many NTS issues, like pandemic disease, are not new; instead, they have come to be seen and managed differently. For example, the 'Spanish flu' of 1918-1919 killed more people than the Great War, but was not seen as a 'security' problem in its own right -only as part of the overall misery of the war and its aftermath. The first book dedicated to it was only published in the mid-1970s (Alcabes, 2009) . By contrast, the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak of 2003 was routinely described as a security threat and dealt with through a range of quite draconian quarantine measures. This is despite the fact that SARS only infected 8,273 people and killed 775 worldwide (Abraham, 2007) . Why the meaning of security and its governance have changed in this way is hard to explain if the emphasis is predominantly on the empirically observed severity of a given phenomenon.
The second approach to understanding the rise of new security issues could be broadly characterised as social constructivist, although some variants operate from specifically poststructuralist premises. These scholars argue that the meaning of security is not derived from empirical observations, but from inter-subjectively held assumptions. Among this group, particularly influential has been the 'securitisation' approach of the Copenhagen School (Buzan et al, 1998) . For the Copenhagen School, 'security' is defined by the outcome of successful 'securitisation' processes. A speaker, typically a figure of authority, describes something as posing an existential threat to a valued referent object. If audiences accept this 'securitisation', the issue is raised to the top of the political agenda, or even above 'normal' political discourse and procedures altogether, and is dealt with through urgent and exceptional means. The observed expansion of the security agenda is seen to be the extension of such processes to issues and referent objects previously dealt with as routine public policy or political issues. While this approach avoids the weaknesses of the realist/ empiricist accounts described above, why the security agenda should have expanded quite so dramatically in recent decades is not immediately apparent. Because Copenhagen School theorists focus on the discursive 'speech act' of securitisation, they neglect the material aspects of security politics -something an emerging focus on the conditions under which audiences 'accept' securitising moves has barely begun to address. More specifically, very little attention is paid to the links between political economy and security, making it difficult to explain the significance of the presumed link between globalisation and the new security agenda.
What is apparently required is a middle approach that, on the one hand, recognises that the new security agenda and shifts in the global political economy are indeed linked, and, on the other, recognises that the meanings and practices of security are not given from empirical observations alone but are shaped by socio-political contestation. In the contributions to this special issue, we argue that the key nodal point for understanding the relationship between political economy and security is the state. As economies develop and economy-state relations change, the way the state translates economic dynamics into security practices also changes.
At the most general level, the emergence of national security concerns was closely associated with the formation of national states and their consolidation of national economic markets. This was particularly true in Europe, where these processes were accompanied by violent conflicts that further consolidated states' national territories (Hobsbawm, 1962 (Hobsbawm, , 1975 Tilly, 1975; Mann, 1988) . For several European states, this national consolidation was further fuelled by extra-national empire-building. Although this was often initially driven by business actors who maintained their own security apparatuses (Bowen, 2006) , they were gradually supplanted by nationstates, whose growing power was eventually projected worldwide to promote and protect imperialist economic interests (Hobsbawm, 1987) . This new security function generated intensifying imperialist rivalries which increasingly rebounded on intraEuropean relations, climaxing in two World Wars (Hobsbawm, 1994) . After 1945, the European states gradually lost their empires. The Bretton Woods settlement sought to avoid a repeat of past crises through 'embedded liberalism': an open trading system premised on the development of national economies and nationally based, Fordist social contracts between labour and capital (Ruggie, 1982) . Although this settlement was partly upheld through powerful Western states intervening abroad to negate revolutionary threats to economic interests (Barnett, 1970) , the formal sovereignty of nation-states remained the cornerstone of the international system and IS practices in this period (Barkin and Cronin, 1994; Colás, 2008) . The post-war decades were thus the apogee of the consolidation of nation-states as economic units and the bearers of 'security' (Agnew, 2009) .
With the crises of global capitalism in the 1970s, the national compromises between capital, labour and Western states broke down, exacerbating social conflicts that were eventually addressed, to varying degrees, by the neoliberal revolutions pioneered by Thatcher and Reagan. Governments dismantled corporatist and protectionist institutions, unleashing finance capital from national regulatory contexts to seek new markets, forging transnational supply chains. 'Embedded liberalism' was jettisoned in favour of 'flexible accumulation' (Harvey, 2006) . The economic function of states shifted from the development of national economies to the promotion of competitiveness within an increasingly global marketplace -the socalled 'competition state' or 'market state' (Cerny, 1997; Agnew, 2009; Jessop, 2009) . Correspondingly, the security function of states also transformed. To secure capital accumulation, it was no longer sufficient to guard national markets, which in any case were again becoming increasingly internationalised. Instead, states became increasingly concerned with transboundary flows -often themselves contradictory by-products of capitalist development and societies' growing interconnectednessthat imperilled the movement of goods and capital or threatened to upset social or political stability in key economic areas. Although this transformation was reinforced by the end of the Cold War, importantly, it preceded it: concern for environmental security, and an attendant call for the transcendence of sovereign statehood, was already rising by the late 1980s, for example (Mathews, 1989; Mische, 1989) . The clearest sign of this shift was the West's growing focus on 'fragile' or 'failed' states. Weak governance in these domains, perhaps economically insignificant in themselves, was seen as generating or enabling transnational flows and risks -such as irregular migration, disease, crime, terrorism, piracy and environmental degradation -that could 'spill over' to other territories (Fukuyama, 2004) . The 2002 US National Security Strategy pithily encapsulated this fundamental reorientation, stating: 'America is now threatened less by conquering states than … by failing ones' (United States, 2002, p. 1).
Several contributors to this volume theorise various aspects of this transformation in economy-state-security relations and functions. Philip Cerny identifies a historical transformation in the nature of states' organised violence from warfare to police, which he calls the 'civilianisation' of security. Cerny argues that the confluence of economic globalisation, technological innovation and cross-border awareness, as well as new dimensions of global governance, including UN peacekeeping and greater demands for the delivery of global public goods, has rendered state-based military means almost irrelevant for the provision of security. Indeed, the use of violent force has declined dramatically since the 1980s, while inter-state warfare is nearly extinct and even intra-state violence is waning (Pinker, 2012; Themnér and Wallensteen, 2012) . Instead, the 'police' mode of security provision, initially developed to pacify states internally as part of the process of national consolidation, has globalised, as reflected in the prevalence of peacekeeping and statebuilding interventions in the world's periphery (see also Levi and Hagan, 2006) . In a piece that pioneers a poststructuralist political economy approach, Yee-Kuang Heng and Ken McDonagh also explore the implications of historical shifts in the nature of state-economy relations for security, but through the prism of risk and risk management rather than organised violence. They demonstrate how shifts in the political economy over three historical periods have shaped states' relationship to the management of risk, producing three risk management regimes. The first involves maritime insurance in the eighteenth century, in which the state had a very limited role. They then examine the Cold War period, in which the state, particularly the United States, shouldered the role of risk management in relation to the Soviet nuclear threat. Finally, they look at the current period, in which the state regulates a wide range of private actors in risk management. They argue that these transformations in the understanding and management of risk mirror shifts in the underlying political economy, from a disaggregated mercantile system, to the postwar Keynesian-Fordist settlement, in which states played a key role in securing national development, to a neoliberal system, in which states divest themselves of direct economic control and establish facilitating conditions for liberal markets.
Some security scholars have argued that the concepts advanced in these two articles to denote the changing nature of security, namely police and risk, do not in fact refer to 'security' but to other phenomena. Principally, Waever (2011) of the Copenhagen School has argued against introducing 'risk management' into security studies, because it lacks the typical 'emergency' or 'exceptional' responses (in the Schmittian sense) he and his colleagues associate with successful securitisation (see Ciută, 2009 ). For us, this misses the point. Approaching the state-security nexus through a political economy lens reveals, as the contributions here by Cerny, Heng and McDonagh and Dannreuther show, that security's meaning and governance are historically specific, and not timeless or constant. As practices evolve, security is no longer exhausted by moments of 'exception' and the deployment of emergency measures. The governance of terrorism, for example, often does not take this form but rather involves the extension of bureaucratic and surveillance techniques from other areas of governance (Aradau and van Munster, 2007) . To exclude these practices, when the agents involved clearly believe they are 'doing security', defends the parsimony of the Copenhagen School's theory at the cost of progressively rendering security studies obsolete.
What is being Secured?
The question of what is being secured in the name of security has been a particular concern for scholars from the 'Aberystwyth School' of critical security studies concerned with human security (Booth, 1991; Krause and Williams, 1997; CASE Collective, 2006) , and for others for whom the normative implications of security and securitisation are paramount (see McDonald, 2008) . These scholars argue that the referent object of security should shift from national security and the state towards protecting individuals, or 'human security'. Problems like hunger, poverty, domestic violence and so on should be prioritised, it is argued, ahead of traditional security concerns relating to defending the national territory. From this perspective, security is seen to have potentially emancipatory prospects if directed at worthier recipients of protection (Burke, 2013) . Conversely, Copenhagen scholars view normative considerations of whom security should protect as second-order questions and keep their theory of securitisation descriptive, though the claim that their approach is value-free has not gone unchallenged (Hansen, 2000; McDonald, 2008) . Policy-oriented realists have also argued against the widening of the security agenda from an implicitly normative perspective, suggesting that it distracts states from more dangerous threats (Walt, 1991) .
This debate, however important, has prioritised normative questions over explanatory ones, thereby contributing to a tendency within the literature to merely describe, rather than account for, the evolution of the IS agenda. Contributors to this issue, however, approach this question directly, through a political economy lens.
Several authors quite explicitly argue that transnational capitalism is the real object of security, though they differ as to whether this is new. In line with the argument above about the role of states in securing imperialism, Simon Dalby follows Bell (2011) in arguing that security in a liberal sense has always been about securing 'freedom' understood as private property rights, and that even Cold War deterrence was ultimately about protecting states so that they could get on with expanding capitalism. For Dalby, the contemporary security agenda is no different in principle, but reflects the changing nature of state-economy relations and the globalisation of capitalism. Contemporary efforts to tackle climate change are powerfully shaped by market-based logics, and consequently show no sign of stemming carbon dioxide emissions. Likewise, Matt McDonald shows how, despite the initial appearance of successful securitisation of climate change in Australia, securing economic growth has trumped, or co-opted, concerns about the climate, resulting in defeat for those promoting a vigorous response to global warming. However, McDonald underscores that material interests do not translate automatically into security policy, but are politically mediated. By exploring the discursive contestation of and meanings given to material interests, he offers a constructivist analysis of the political economy of NTS.
Roland Dannreuther also shows how economic interests shape what gets secured in the name of 'security'. He points out that 'energy security' potentially has several meanings. It could, for example, refer to access to energy for poor people in developing countries; but, in practice, its primary meaning refers to dominant states' access to affordable oil or gas. Accordingly, energy security concerns appear to be increasing today, not merely because of worries over price and availability, but also because the West fears China's rise may potentially upset the dominant, neoliberal mode of market-based energy governance established in the 1980s and 1990s. This reminds us that what gets secured in the name of security is not necessarily 'the economy' in some abstract sense, but quite specific economic interests -a point also made by McDonald. Similarly, Heng and McDonagh, when discussing the political economy of risk management, show how particular firms peddling solutions to insecurity benefit from the identification of new threats. Thus, part of what is being secured in the name of security in this case is the reproduction of military-industrial complexes.
A related issue here is the apparent disjuncture between the ultimate object of security and how this securitisation is expressed politically. As Hameiri and Jones show in their contribution, NTS threats are typically seen to be transboundary in nature, giving rise to demands that they be governed transnationally. Similarly, the capitalist economy is transnational. And yet, the security politics that emerges from this often assumes a national form. Dalby's argument that Cold War nuclear deterrence was about securing states so they could get on with expanding global capitalism clearly expresses this disjuncture. The ultimate object being secured was transnational capitalism, but this was achieved by securing a specifically national form of state. This apparent mismatch arguably reflects capitalism's ultimate dependence upon states, and how its development has been closely bound up with state practices, particularly those of the United States (see Panitch and Gindin, 2012) . In any case, many of the contributions to the special issue contend that the disjuncture between the scale of the problem being secured and the national focus of government is growing, relative to the Cold War period. This seems to mirror trends in the political economy, whereby political institutions have largely remained confined to national territories while economic organisation has transnationalised.
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This disjuncture clearly fuels calls for the development of new modes of governance that transcend the territorial limits of individual nation-states.
How is Security being Governed?
The literature on IS has relatively little to say about security governance. With rare exceptions, the handful of studies of security governance are typically comparative overviews of great powers and formal, regional, interstate organisations, often focused on traditional security and defence matters, neglecting the new security agenda (for example, Kirchner and Sperling, 2007; Breslin and Croft, 2012) . The Copenhagen School does not consider security governance at all. Their approach implies that the extraordinary means for dealing with particular security problems are essentially co-constructed as part of the securitising move (Buzan et al, 1998, p. 26) . In reality, however, there is often a wide gap between the discourse of threat and the actual response. It is not unusual to find that, despite a strong rhetoric of securitisation, little actually happens, or that the language is not commensurate with the urgency of the response (Caballero-Anthony, 2008; Tsoukala, 2008) . The remarkable dominance of the Copenhagen School's approach, with its constructivist focus on 'speech acts', has entrenched a relative neglect of governance, and its material context. Some poststructuralist approaches to securitisation, mainly the Paris School, do take security governance more seriously (Bigo, 2001; CASE Collective, 2006; Huysmans, 2006) . Arguably, however, their narrow focus on the role of security professionals in defining (in)security also pays insufficient attention to the wider context -including the political economy relations -within which these actors operate, and which may clarify the opportunities and constraints they face (Hameiri and Jones, 2013) .
By contrast, the study of new and emerging forms of international and transnational governance has been central to IPE's concerns. Beginning in the 1970s with the concept of complex interdependence, and later through studies of international regimes and global governance (Sinclair, 2012) , IPE scholars have developed sophisticated understandings of the drivers, dynamics and effects of efforts to manage new issues of international significance, such as trade, investment and finance. However, owing to the historical distinction between 'high' and 'low' politics, reflected in the sub-disciplinary silos of IS and IPE (Mastanduno, 1998) , the significance of this research on governance for security matters has rarely been considered. Security scholars too often simply assume that security issues are just too important for states to relinquish control over. Yet, what we find in relation to the new security agenda is that, since the issues examined are at least potentially transnational, many of the concerns of the literature on interdependence and global governance are of relevance here.
In this special issue, explaining the forms security governance assumes is a major objective, arising from our concern to understand the implications of the aforementioned disjuncture between the scale of NTS problems and the scale at which these are governed. The articles advance three basic, but often overlapping positions in this respect. The first is that the politico-economic order produced during the Cold War era remains essentially intact as the main focal point for IS practices. Simon Dalby argues that, although Western states have since retreated from a developmentalist role, in the immediate post-WWII era they created suburbanised and militarised economies premised on high levels of consumption of hydrocarbons. Perpetuating this structure -rather than radically rethinking it -is now the focus of those states' security policies. This leads Western agencies to promote the transformation of local institutions in developing countries to create carbon markets -for example, the development of forest plantations as 'carbon sinks' -which allows Western emissions to be 'offset', rather than actually reduced. For Dalby, this constrained transformation of governance is never likely to tackle growing climate insecurity.
The second view, advanced mainly by Philip Cerny, is that the state-based order, which is inept at solving new security problems due to the aforementioned mismatch, is changing somewhat through new transnational networks for managing these problems, but much more remains to be done. For him, the nature of 'security' has been transformed profoundly by globalisation, with threats now emanating from nonstate actors and conflicts, rather than interstate military rivalry. State apparatuses, increasingly enmeshed across territorial borders, have begun responding to this challenge by externalising the formerly domestic logic of 'police', addressing the new threats as 'criminal' disruptions of international law and order, rather than resorting to war. This has incrementally generated experiments in international governance. However, Cerny argues, given the hegemony of the nation-state in the imaginations of security practitioners, insecurity often induces a contradictory flight back to 'the obsolete power games of nation-states'. With the global system caught between these two logics, Cerny urges a 'paradigm shift' away from the state-based order.
The third and final position, taken primarily by Hameiri and Jones, Heng and McDonagh, and Dannreuther, is that demands for modes of security governance to better map onto security threats or referent objects, and particularly for changes in the scale of governance, drive the reconfiguration of security governance in far more significant ways. However, although change can be observed, it is socially and politically contested, and constrained by political economy factors inherited from the past. Hence, the form that security governance assumes is not given but depends on shifting strategies, power relations and conflicts.
Hameiri and Jones, for example, see contestation over the appropriate scale at which an NTS issue is to be governed, as well as struggles to define the instruments and actors involved in governing, as being at the heart of the politics of NTS. The claim that security governance has to better reflect the scope of the problem is a means by which powerful actors seek to shift, or rescale, the management of these issues into new modes of security governance, dominated by unelected experts. Drawing on work in political geography (Massey, 1992; Harvey, 2006) , they argue that scale is critical because every scalar arrangement offers uneven resources, benefits and political opportunity structures to different societal groups. The issue for Hameiri and Jones, then, is not whether security governance has transformed far enough to meet the needs of the hour, but how and why security governance has transformed, if at all, and what are the political and normative implications of this transformation, or indeed its absence.
A closely related question refers to the function and form that state apparatuses take, or should take, in new governance arrangements. As noted earlier, the formation of national states and economies is often seen to give rise to 'national' security practices and modes of governance: economic development and resources are mobilised by states to enable them to make war, which in turn makes states, to paraphrase Tilly's (1975) famous dictum. As we discussed in relation to imperialism, prior to the significant development of national economies, states might play a minor role in providing security; but as states take a larger role in economic management, so too they enhance their security provision. Heng and McDonagh's paper illustrates this transformation clearly, through its analysis of the political economy of risk and risk management. They track the shift from disaggregated, privately provided risk insurance in mercantile Europe to centralised, state-provided risk insurance in the Cold War. In the earlier period, risk management was not really a security concern at all, but an important element in the facilitation of trade. Later, in the Cold War era, new forms of securitised risk emerged, particularly in relation to Soviet nuclear power, with the state consolidating its legitimacy through both the protection of populations from potential nuclear disaster and the provision of social welfare. Their article is also suggestive of a post-Cold War move to again outsource security 'insurance' provision to the private sector, as the state's intervention in economic management declines. Hameiri and Jones go further, identifying the process of state transformation as the dynamic by which NTS governance is emerging today. For them, a key precursor for this transformation is the rise of a regulatory mode of statehood, which has been accelerated by economic globalisation -initially in the West but now increasingly worldwide (Majone, 1997; Jayasuriya, 2001; Dubash and Morgan, 2013) . The delegation and fragmentation of state authority this involves enables the promotion of new forms of transnational security governance that network together disaggregated state agencies, non-governmental and international actors in complex, multilevel arrangements. This process involves the contested rescaling and internationalisation of state apparatuses, which privileges various forms of scientific and managerial expertise over other political agendas. Like regulatory governance more broadly, then, NTS governance attempts to limit the range of issues managed through democratic political institutions. However, this is always subject to contestation, shaped by political economy and wider social power relations, and consequently such attempts are not uniformly successful.
Conclusion
This special issue covers rarely charted territory at the intersection of IS and IPE. The apparent rise of a host of NTS problems has been attributed by many policymakers and observers to intensified economic globalisation. But despite this assumed connection, there has been little analysis of the precise relationship between the NTS agenda and the global political economy. The IS literature has tended to see NTS as either a response to changes in the real threat environment, or as the extension of securitisation processes from interstate security to new challenges and sectors. It has not, however, tended to link these analyses to the shifting political economy. IPE literature, on the other hand, despite its central concern with political economy and governance, has yet to systematically investigate security matters.
Mindful of this gap in our understanding of NTS, the contributions to this collection collectively and individually grapple with a range of questions pertaining to the nexus between security and the political economy. As with this introductory article, they are organised around three main themes. The first is the broad relationship between political economy and security. We argue that the nodal point linking the two is the state. As economy-state relations shift and the economy evolves, the way the state translates this process into security practices changes also. So while previously security was linked to the long-term project of establishing national states, governing national economies and populations, currently the partial weakening of this link as a result of globalisation has also transformed security's definition and the state's security practices. The second theme is the question of what is being secured. The contributors argue that it is in fact the economy that is being secured in the name of security, although there is disagreement over whether this is novel or not. Finally, we examine the nature of security governance, a particularly neglected area, in which IPE scholarship potentially has much to offer IS studies. Here, we argue that state transformation is a key process through which security governance is emerging in relation to NTS. The contributions differ, however, over the extent to which this process has occurred, or should occur.
Considering these insights, the investigation of state transformation and its links with security governance presents potentially fruitful avenues for further research. Some tentative steps have been taken here but it is clear that much more work is required to analyse the factors shaping the internal transformation of states in the process of governing transnational security problems. Nevertheless, the special issue clearly establishes that research into the new security agenda will remain stunted unless IS specialists and political economists break down the sub-disciplinary walls separating these groups.
Notes
1 Reflecting the wider literature, this special issue does not include 'new wars' and/or civil wars in its definition of NTS, which is what we signify by 'the new security agenda'; nor do we discuss 'human security'. 2 A few scholars argue that political organisation is globalising, for example, through the emergence of a 'world state' (Shaw, 2000) , but the vast majority of literature on 'global governance' emphasises its fragmented, messy, uneven and often ineffective nature (for example, Williams and Harman, 2013).
